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The Constitution and Revenge 
Porn 
 
John A. Humbach* 
 
“Many are those who must endure speech they do not like, but 
that is a necessary cost of freedom.”1 
 
Revenge porn refers to sexually explicit photos and videos 
that are posted online or otherwise disseminated without the 
consent of the persons shown, generally in retaliation for a 
romantic rebuff.2  The problem of revenge porn seems to have 
emerged fairly recently,3 no doubt facilitated by the widespread 
practice of sexting.4  In sexting, people make and send explicit 
pictures of themselves using digital devices.5  These devices, in 
their very nature, permit the pictures to be easily shared with 
the entire online world.  Although the move from sexting to 
revenge porn might seem as inevitable as the shifting winds 
 
 * Professor of Law at Pace University School of Law. 
1. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2669 (2011). 
2. See State 'Revenge Porn' Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Aug. 15, 2014), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/state-revenge-porn-legislation.aspx. 
3. There were relatively few searches on the term “revenge porn” until 
about 2013, when searches on the term skyrocketed.  See Revenge Porn, 
GOOGLE TRENDS, http://www.google.com/trends/explore#q=revenge%20porn 
(last visited Aug. 27, 2014). 
4. See, e.g., David Rosen, We Are All Sexters Now: America’s Favorite 
Amateur Porn, SALON (Aug 16, 2014), available at 
http://www.salon.com/2014/08/16/we_are_all_sexters_now_americas_favorite_
amateur_porn. According to a 2010 survey, 43% of teens and 28% of parents 
engaged in sexting behavior. Stephanie Steinberg, 'Sexting' Surges 
Nationwide, and It's Not Just Teens Doing It, USA TODAY (July 20, 2010), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/life/lifestyle/2010-07-21-
texting21_ST_N.htm.  The numbers are likely larger today.  See Matthew 
Mientka, 'Sexting' Now Mainstream as Half of U.S. Adults Send and Receive, 
MED. DAILY (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.medicaldaily.com/sexting-now-
mainstream-half-us-adults-send-and-receive-268703. 
5. For my earlier discussion of sexting, see John A. Humbach, “Sexting” 
and the First Amendment, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433 (2010). 
1
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and tides of amorous affection, people have been caught off-
guard,6 and revenge porn has become a significant item of 
moral and legal concern.7 
The inherent repulsiveness of revenge porn has led to calls 
for laws making it a crime and, as of this writing, at least ten 
states have enacted statutes to prohibit revenge-porn 
dissemination.8  Moreover, an important article offering 
“recommendations to lawmakers working to criminalize 
revenge porn” was recently published by Professors Danielle 
Keats Citron (University of Maryland) and Mary Anne Franks 
(University of Miami).9  While there are variations in the 
 
6. Both men and women are reportedly victimized by revenge porn. 
Cynthia J. Najdowski, PhD, and Meagen M. Hildegrand, The Criminalization 
of ‘Revenge Porn’, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N MONITOR ON PSYCHOLOGY 26 
(2014), available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/01/jn.aspx. However, 
while “[m]en are more likely than women to report being victims of this 
online privacy invasion[,]” id. (citation omitted), it has been argued that the 
impact on women may be greater because “[w]hen it comes to sexual 
expression, females are denied the freedoms enjoyed by men.” Emily 
Poole, Hey Girls, Do you Know? Slut-Shaming on the Internet Needs to Stop, 
48 U.S.F. L. Rev. 221, 222 (2013). The unfortunate social reality is that, for 
women whose conduct “do[es] not conform with traditional gender 
expectations,” “slut shaming remains a tremendous problem.” Id. at 231-32. 
It “not only demeans women, but it also highlights the sexual double 
standard rampant in our society.” Id. at 232.  “The emotional harms caused 
by slut-shaming [including revenge porn] can follow a woman around for 
years, damage her self-perception, and possibly cause her either to dismiss 
her own sexuality or be labeled as easy . . . .” Id. at 232-33 (emphasis in 
original). 
7. See, e.g., Editorial, Fighting Back Against Revenge Porn, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 13, 2013, at SR10; Erica Goode, Once Scorned, But on Revenge Sites, 
Twice Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 23, 2013, at A11; Lorelei Laird, Victims Are 
Taking on ‘Revenge Porn’ Websites for Posting Photos They Did Not Consent 
To, A.B.A. (Nov. 1, 2013), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/victims_are_taking_on_revenge_
porn_websites_for_posting_photos_they_didnt_c; David Schwartz, Arizona 
Governor Signs Legislation to Discourage 'Revenge Porn,' REUTERS (Apr. 30, 
2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/01/us-usa-arizona-
revengeporn-idUSBREA4000T20140501. 
8. See State ‘Revenge Porn’ Legislation, supra note 2; see, e.g., CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9 (West 
2004). Commentator Rachel Budde describes that recent flurry of revenge 
porn as exemplifying emotion-driven “crime du jour legislation.” Rachel E. 
Budde, Taking the Sting Out of Revenge Porn: Using Criminal Statutes to 
Safeguard Sexual Autonomy in the Digital Age, __ GEO. J. OF GENDER & THE 
LAW __, 39 (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2424518. 
9. Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/8
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specific provisions of the various revenge porn laws, both as 
enacted and proposed, they typically share two key 
prohibitions, namely, they forbid: 
 
 images that show sexual exposure or contact, and 
 dissemination without consent of persons depicted. 
 
Unfortunately, these two key prohibitions of revenge porn 
laws seem to fly directly in the face of the free speech and press 
guarantees of the First Amendment.10  In short, the two 
prohibitions constitute unconstitutional content discrimination, 
viewpoint discrimination and speaker discrimination, not to 
mention prior restraint.  A restriction on speech that is limited 
to particular content, e.g., sexual exposure, is content 
discrimination.11  A restriction designed to suppress a 
particular point of view, e.g., negative or unflattering personal 
information, is viewpoint discrimination.12  And a restriction 
that is applicable only to persons who have not received 
consent is speaker discrimination,13 as well as a prior 
 
Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 386 (2013).  In a subsequent publication 
on the Social Science Research network, Professor Franks has proposed a 
model for revenge porn laws, which reads in principal part: 
 
An actor may not knowingly disclose an image of another, 
identifiable person, whose intimate parts are exposed or 
who is engaged in a sexual act, when the actor knows or 
should have known that the depicted person has not 
consented to such disclosure. 
 
Mary Anne Franks, Drafting an Effective “Revenge Porn” Law: A Guide for 
Legislators 5 (2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2468823. 
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
11. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 811-12 
(2000); Sable Commc’ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 118 (1989); see also 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (“It 
is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its 
substantive content or the message it conveys.”). 
12. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828; see also Wood v. Moss, 134 S. 
Ct. 2056, 2069 (2014) (recognizing the rule). 
13. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828 (“[G]overnment regulation may not 
favor one speaker over another.”). Actually, the consent requirement results 
in both viewpoint discrimination and speaker discrimination by limiting 
communication to selected viewpoints and speakers while criminalizing the 
rest.  The overall effect of consent requirements is to permit positive personal 
3
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restraint—among the most disfavored of restrictions on 
speech.14 
While the Supreme Court has recognized a number of 
circumstances that justify government impingements on free 
expression, the Court has been extremely reluctant to permit 
speech restrictions that discriminate based on a message’s 
content, its viewpoint, or the speaker.15  It has nearly always 
refused to tolerate such discrimination unless the case falls 
within one of the several historically established exceptions to 
First Amendment protection.16  Because of the special place 
that the modern First Amendment cases accord to content 
discrimination (and the allied discriminations based on 
viewpoint and speaker), any statutes designed specifically to 
outlaw revenge porn as such17 would seem to face some very 
tough sledding—if indeed they can be written in ways that are 
constitutionally permissible at all. 
At the end of this paper, I propose a possible approach to 
crafting a law that addresses the primary harms of revenge 
porn, but which seeks avoid the direct affront to the First 
Amendment of the revenge porn laws currently proposed and 
enacted.  Whether this approach would actually work is a 
question that cannot be answered with certainty but, unless 
the Supreme Court changes the application of the First 
Amendment to accommodate revenge porn, I think its chances 
are at least better than the statutes, drafts and proposals to 
date. 
 
I. Basic Meaning of the First Amendment 
 
 
information to be communicated by approved speakers while suppressing 
disapproved negative private information.  See also Sorrell v. IMS Health 
Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011) (disapproving a law that enacted “content- 
and speaker-based restrictions” on the disclosure of private physician-
prescribing information). 
14. See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra Part II. 
16. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012); 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. 
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994); infra Part II.B. 
17. I.e., statutes whose prohibition is limited to sexually explicit images 
disseminated without consent. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/8
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The First Amendment declares that “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”18  
The basic meaning of this clause is, of course, to restrict the 
government’s power.19  Specifically, the Free Speech Clause 
restricts the government’s power to address a particular class 
of potentially harmful conduct—namely, conduct that consists 
of speech.  This limitation on the government’s power to deal 
with harms caused by speech is in distinct contrast with the 
broad power that the government has to deal with social harm 
generally. 
With respect to most kinds of harm, governmental bodies 
are traditionally deemed to have the power to restrict private 
liberty “wherever the public interests demand it,”20 and 
legislatures possess “a large discretion . . . to determine, not 
only what the interests of the public require, but what 
measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.” 21  
Under what is known as the “rational basis” test, the rule is 
that “when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has 
been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”22  The “rational 
basis” test is, in other words, an expression of the judiciary’s 
broad deference to the legislative branch to decide what the 
 
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
19. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“But, 
above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to 
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its 
content.”).  See also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010); 
Landmark Commc’ns v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 844 (1978) (a “check” on 
legislative power). 
20. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894). 
21. Id. 
22. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31-35 (1954); see also Board of 
Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (under the rational basis test, it 
“suffices if the law could be thought to further a legitimate governmental 
goal, without reference to whether it does so at inordinate cost”).  The Court 
has, in other words, expressly abandoned the former idea that the 
legislature’s “determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police 
powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the 
courts.”  Lawton, 152 U.S. at 137.  See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 
304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“The existence of facts supporting the legislative 
judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary 
commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in 
the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a 
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational 
basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”). 
5
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public interest requires and what laws are appropriate to serve 
the public’s needs.  Courts do not normally second-guess 
legislative decisions. 
For harms caused by speech, however, the rule is entirely 
different.  Measures to address speech harms (real or alleged) 
are subject to heightened standards of judicial review.  The 
“presumption of constitutionality” that the courts normally 
apply to non-speech conduct is reversed.23  Instead, courts 
assessing restrictions on speech use a level of scrutiny that is 
called (depending on the context) “intermediate” scrutiny or 
“strict” scrutiny.24  Use of “intermediate” or “strict” scrutiny 
entails active judicial review of the challenged legislation, its 
effects on free expression and its putative compensating 
benefits.25  The operating assumption is that any harm that 
might result from speech is less serious than the harm that 
results from government restrictions on it.26 
Of course, as often stressed by advocates of laws to 
impinge on free expression, “the right of free speech is not 
absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”27  There are 
exceptions to the protection of speech, and we will consider 
them in the discussion that follows.  For the moment, however, 
it suffices to say that, just because there are some exceptions to 
the protection of speech, it does not follow that legislatures can 
restrict speech whenever they decide it is “too harmful to be 
tolerated”28 or not “worth it.”29  On the contrary, the very “point 
of all speech protection . . . is to shield [speech] that in 
someone’s eyes [is] misguided, or even hurtful.”30  “The First 
 
23. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 659 (2004); United States v. 
Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
24. See generally Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 
(1994). 
25. See infra Part II.A. Strict Scrutiny. 
26. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The First 
Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the 
benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.”). 
27. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). 
28. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011). 
29. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470. 
30. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (quoting Hurley v. 
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 574 
(1995)). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/8
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Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people 
that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government 
outweigh the costs.”31 
 
II. Content Discrimination 
 
As stated in the introduction, revenge porn laws face a 
major First Amendment hurdle because their explicit and 
unabashed aim is to punish and suppress disfavored speech.  
As such, they constitute content discrimination and its 
aggravated variants, viewpoint discrimination and speaker 
discrimination (hereafter sometimes collectively referred to as, 
simply, “content discrimination”).  Since R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul,32 at least, the Supreme Court’s free speech cases have 
come to treat content discrimination as the least tolerated 
variety of governmental regulation on free expression.  So even 
while the freedom of speech may not be “absolute,”33 what has 
become nearly absolute is the constitutional prohibition on 
governmental efforts to repress disfavored ideas, facts, 
viewpoints or speakers: “[A]s a general matter, . . . government 
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”34 
The Supreme Court’s particular attention to content 
discrimination has led to a division of speech restrictions into 
to two major groups: restrictions that are content-neutral and 
those that are content-based.35  An example of content-neutral 
restrictions is one that regulates merely the time, place and 
manner of expression, without regard to the ideas, facts or 
 
31. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470. 
32. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). The history of content-discrimination 
jurisprudence goes back even further, at least as far back as Police Dep't of 
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), which specifically identified content 
discrimination, viewpoint (“points of view”) discrimination and speaker 
discrimination (“some groups [and not] others”) as needing to be “carefully 
scrutinized.” However, it is beginning with R.A.V. that the Supreme Court 
has recognized content discrimination as a recurrent principal basis for its 
First Amendment decisions. 
33. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). 
34. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (quoting 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)). 
35. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994); e.g., 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800-01 (1989). 
7
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message expressed—a ban, for example, on loud, amplified 
music in a public park.36  Another example is a law that is 
merely meant to address the so-called “secondary effects” of 
speech.37  By contrast, restrictions are content-based when they 
burden or restrict speech based on its subject matter or on the 
viewpoint that is expressed.38 
When assessing content-neutral restrictions on speech, the 
Supreme Court has been relatively amenable to balancing 
harms (for example, holding that speech freedom may have to 
yield to other significant governmental interests),39 but it has 
been almost unbending in its protection of speech from content 
discrimination.  Not only does the Court hold that “content-
 
36. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 789 (loud, amplified music in a public park).  
See e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-88 (1949) (sound trucks). 
37. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) 
(upholding a zoning law that created a zone for adult theatres). The 
“secondary effects” that were the target of the laws in Renton were the blight 
and other negative neighborhood impacts of theaters showing sexually-
themed movies. These secondary effects are to be distinguished from the 
primary effects of speech, which refers to the effects that the speech has on 
its audience, Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988), and the effects it has on 
the broader society through of the effects that the speech has on listeners. See 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 394 n.7. The distinctive concept of 
“secondary effects” has been somewhat difficult to nail down, but the 
difference between it and “primary” effects seems to be roughly this: Whereas 
the primary effects of speech are the effects of its content on listeners, the 
secondary effects are the effects that dissemination has on the locations where 
it occurs (ambiance, tone, property values, etc.). In any case, so far the 
Supreme Court has not extended the application of the secondary-effects 
doctrine beyond its original context—as a justification for upholding zoning 
laws that are aimed, not at particular messages, but at preserving intangible 
qualities of neighborhoods. 
 At any rate, “[t]he emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a 
‘secondary effect’” and a law that “regulates speech due to its potential 
primary impact … must be considered content-based.” Barry, 485 U.S. at 321.  
Likewise, “[l]isteners' reactions to speech are not the type of ‘secondary 
effects’ we referred to in Renton.”  Id.  For these reasons, arguments that 
revenge porn laws might be able to pass constitutional scrutiny on a 
“secondary effects” theory (that they target only emotional secondary effects, 
not content) would appear to be a non-starter. 
38. See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642-43; Police Dep't of Chicago v. 
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“But, above all else, the First Amendment 
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”). 
39. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 801; Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 
468 U.S. 288, 308 (1984). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/8
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based regulations are presumptively invalid”40 but, with 
narrow exceptions,41 such regulations must pass the highest 
level of scrutiny, so-called “strict” scrutiny, in order to 
overcome that presumption.42  The exacting test of strict 
scrutiny applies to any “regulations reflecting ‘aversion’ to 
what ‘disfavored speakers’ have to say,”43 and that is exactly 
what the currently enacted and proposed revenge porn laws 
are—regulations reflecting a legislative “aversion” to what 
“disfavored speakers” have to say. 
To be sure, even when restrictions on speech are based on 
content, they are not necessarily subject to strict scrutiny.  The 
Supreme Court has recognized a number of special kinds of 
cases in which content-based restrictions are constitutionally 
weighed under less strict standards.44  Most of these special 
kinds of cases (such as the rules for school speech, government-
employee speech or broadcast speech) have little or no broad 
applicability to the social problems posed by revenge porn.  
Two, however, offer some promise and, together with the 
possibility of passing strict scrutiny, they give us the following 
three possible theories in support of laws designed to reduce 
the harms, particularly the emotional and privacy harms, 
which revenge porn can produce: 
 
 
40. United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000).  See 
also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382. 
41. See infra Part II.B. Categorical Exceptions. 
42. See infra Part II.A. Strict Scrutiny. 
43. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011) (describing 
reasoning in Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 658). 
44. The situations in which regulations of speech are not necessarily 
subject to strict scrutiny would include: categorical exceptions, incidental 
burdens on speech, non-public forum speech, school speech, copyrighted 
content, government employee speech, speech harmful to minors, 
television/radio broadcasts, commercial speech, and publicly funded speech. 
 While the “categorical exceptions” to First Amendment protection (first 
item on this list) have not been said by the Court to include the other listed 
special situations, it is not easy to see why the others should be treated 
separately.  For example, the special situation of “government employee 
speech” (with its exception for speech on matters of public concern, see 
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)) can be easily seen as 
analogous to the categorical exception for defamation (with its similar 
exception for public officials and figures, see N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964)).  
9
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• The statute can pass strict scrutiny 
• A “categorical exception” applies 
• The burdens on speech are deemed “incidental” 
 
The three will be considered in turn.45 
 
A. Strict Scrutiny 
 
The level of scrutiny that a content-based restriction must 
normally pass is “strict” scrutiny,46 which is, as the name 
implies, a highly rigorous standard of review.  Under strict 
scrutiny, the aims of the First Amendment are treated as 
imperatives of the first-order, not to be subordinated to 
competing governmental interests except in extraordinary 
cases. The Court itself has stressed: “It is rare that a regulation 
restricting speech because of its content will ever be 
permissible.”47  Constitutional scholar Gerald Gunther once 
quipped, the Supreme Court’s highest level of scrutiny is “strict 
in theory and fatal in fact.”48 
 
45. The special situation of copyrighted content, listed in the preceding 
footnote, provides another possible constitutional basis for statutes 
criminalizing revenge porn, viz. the Copyright Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 8. Existing copyright laws may not be well suited to deal with revenge 
porn effectively, but it is conceivable that new laws under the copyright 
power could be designed specifically to suppress undesirable re-dissemination 
of copyrightable explicit images. See Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. 
L. REV. 2025 (2014); Amanda Lewendowski, Using Copyright to Combat 
Revenge Porn, 3 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 422 (2014). Whether, 
however, the copyright power, which was meant to incentivize speech and 
creativity, could be properly applied for the purpose of suppressing truth is a 
question for another paper. See Rebecca Tushnet, How Many Wrongs Make a 
Copyright?, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2346 (2014). 
46. See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011); 
United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (citing Sable 
Commc’ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)). 
47. Entm’t Merchs., 131 S. Ct. at 2738. 
48. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1972) (internal quotation omitted).  Barry McDonald has noted that “a 
majority of the Court has never sustained a regulation that was strictly 
scrutinized for content discrimination reasons.” Barry P. McDonald, Speech 
and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of 
Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1365 n.63 (2006) (quoted in United 
States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 559 U.S. 460 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/8
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Formally speaking, in order to meet strict scrutiny a 
regulation of speech must: 
 
 serve a compelling governmental interest; 
 be narrowly tailored to meet the public need; and 
 lack less restrictive alternatives for achieving the 
government’s goal.49 
 
These three elements of strict scrutiny each present 
factual questions, and the government “bears the risk of 
uncertainty.”50  Strict scrutiny means that, instead of deferring 
to the legislature on these questions (as under the rational 
basis test), courts must make their own “independent judgment 
of the facts”51 and assure that “[the legislature] has drawn 
reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.”52  Courts 
“may not simply assume that the [law] will always advance the 
asserted state interests sufficiently to justify its abridgment of 
expressive activity.”53  On the contrary, a law that burdens free 
expression “requires a justification far stronger than mere 
speculation about serious harms,”54 and “ambiguous proof will 
not suffice.”55  Rather, the government “must demonstrate that 
the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the 
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and 
material way.”56  And, most importantly for the present 
 
(2010)). 
49. See, e.g., Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. at 813; Boos v. Barry, 485 
U.S. 312, 321, 329 (1998). 
50. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004) (“[T]he Government 
bear[s] the burden of showing their constitutionality.”); Entm’t Merchs., 131 
S. Ct. at 2739 (stating that the government “bears the risk of uncertainty”). 
51. Sable Commc'ns, 492 U.S. at 129. 
52. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994) (Kennedy, 
J., plurality). 
53. Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc'ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986) 
(quoting Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 
U.S. 789, 803 n.22 (1984)). 
54. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 
(1995) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 664) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
55. Entm't Merchs., 131 S. Ct. at 2739 (2011). 
56. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 664; Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union, 
513 U.S. at 475 (applying same rigor as for content discrimination); see also 
United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000). 
11
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context, the government must show that the law was prompted 
“by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort 
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
viewpoint.”57 
In short, the application of strict scrutiny to revenge porn 
laws will put into sharp focus the harms caused by 
disseminating others’ intimate photos as well as the harms, if 
any, in banning such dissemination.  The harms caused by 
revenge porn seem obvious and well-understood but, because 
they are, so to speak, harms caused by truth, they present 
themselves in an awkward posture under the First 
Amendment.  Dissemination of truth seems, after all, to be 
exactly the kind of thing that the First Amendment exists to 
protect. 
 
1. Truth Is Harmful? 
 
Sometimes a law restricting speech is enacted for the very 
purpose of preventing dissemination of truthful information—
bluntly, to suppress truth.58 The assumption underlying such 
laws is, presumably, that if people know the truth—at least 
certain truths—it can be a bad thing.59  In other words, the 
“harm” these laws seek to prevent is the harm that results 
because the truth gets out. 
So, can truth be harmful? The answer is yes and no. While 
revelations of truth can undeniably cause individualized harm, 
this is not the same as saying the revelations cause social 
harm. Individualized harm and social harm are not the same 
 
57. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 
(1969) (emphasis added). 
58. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (striking 
down a law that restricts disclosure of data concerning the prescribing habits 
of physicians); see United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (law 
prohibiting depictions of scene of animal cruelty); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 
U.S. 524 (1989) (names of alleged crime victims); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g 
Co. 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (names of alleged juvenile offenders); Landmark 
Commc’ns v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (information concerning an 
administrative proceeding); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) 
(names of certain crime victims). 
59. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670 (observing, in the context of a law 
restricting truthful speech: “Those who seek to censor or burden free 
expression often assert that disfavored speech has adverse effects.”). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/8
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thing.60  For example, revealing evidence of illegal or immoral 
acts may cause a good deal of individualized harm to the 
persons whose conduct is exposed, but it seems hard to say that 
reporting crime or immorality causes social harm.  In ordinary 
day-to-day life, we are constantly required to repose trust in 
the others with whom we deal, meaning we must repeatedly 
decide whether and to what degree trust is safe and 
appropriate.61  Most people would presumably prefer that these 
decisions be informed rather than uninformed and, in this 
regard, people may especially want to know what others have 
done of which they are not especially proud.  Deliberate 
obstructions to the free flow of this information would be a 
definite harm to the interest that people have in knowing who 
among us strays beyond the bounds of the law or morality.62 
 
60. The harms suffered in a romantic rebuff provide an obvious example.  
Even though amorous rejection often leads to a lot of emotional anguish and 
torment, no one thinks the “pangs of despised love” should be considered a 
social harm or that refusing an unwanted relationship should be grounds for 
legal redress. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1. 
      More generally, individualized harms and social harm are different 
simply because people’s individual interests are often in conflict and the law 
has no alternative but to choose which interests to favor, leaving the harms 
to the disfavored interests as unredressable damnum sine injuria.  As a 
result, there are many, many individual harms that cannot be considered as 
social harms. 
61. An ability to trust appropriately is obviously a matter of utmost 
importance in managing the riskiness inherent in dealing with other people 
and it has, indeed, been observed that the human brain is “wired” to begin 
judging the trustworthiness of a new acquaintance almost instantly (33 
milliseconds), even before the person’s face is consciously perceived. Jonathan 
B. Freeman et al., Amygdala Responsivity to High-Level Social Information 
from Unseen Faces, 34 THE J. OF NEUROSCIENCE 10573 (2014), available at 
http://www.jneurosci.org/content/34/32/10573.short?rss=1.  But more 
information will nearly always provide greater security and, given the costs 
of unnecessary precautions, it is natural that people crave information about 
others in order to make well-founded judgments about whom to trust and 
how much. 
62. Is the conduct that is revealed by revenge porn illegal or immoral? 
Perhaps. It is, for example, a federal felony to create sexually explicit images, 
even non-obscene pictures of oneself, without affixing to them certain 
statements informing viewers where to find the name, birth date and other 
personal information about each of the persons depicted. See 18 U.S.C. § 2257 
(2012). While there is much to question and dislike about § 2257 in terms of 
the First Amendment, it has been defended in court by successive 
administrations (Bush and Obama), and it has been upheld as constitutional.  
See Connection Distrib. Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc).  
To the extent that § 2257 means that revenge porn amounts to a public 
13
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The Supreme Court, at any rate, takes the position that 
the First Amendment represents a “judgment by the American 
people”63 that the harm of suppressing truth exceeds the 
benefits, adding that the courts are not empowered to “revise 
that judgment” or make exceptions based on “an ad hoc 
balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”64  To see why 
the Court has taken this position—that the benefits of truth 
are constitutionally deemed to exceed the detriments—consider 
one of the examples of harm reported by victims of revenge 
porn, viz. the loss of job opportunities after potential employers 
find an applicant’s nude pictures online.65 
 
revelation of federal felonies, the senders of revenge porn may be thought (by 
some, at least) to provide an unintended public service.  At any rate, it is 
hard to see how the states could have a “compelling” state interest in 
suppressing evidence of federal felonies. 
 As for the idea that revenge porn exposes “immoral” conduct, I would stress 
that I, personally, see nothing inherently “immoral” about taking and 
sending sexually explicit pictures of oneself, but I also realize that others are 
entitled to take a different view (and probably do). See, e.g., Texting, Sexting 
and the Right Thing, THE GOOD NEWS, http://www.ucg.org/video/christian-
living/texting-sexting-and-right-thing/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2015); Is Texting 
a Sin?, YOUTH PASTOR ADAM (Feb. 10, 2012),  
http://youthpastoradamk.wordpress.com/2012/02/10/is-sexting-a-sin/. As 
elaborated in the text that follows, the point of the First Amendment is to 
assure that judgments as to what information is important, morally or 
otherwise, should be left to the people, not to the government. 
63. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470. 
64. Id. 
65. See Citron & Franks, note 9, at 352 (“Common reasons for not 
interviewing and hiring applicants include concerns about their ‘lifestyle,’ 
‘inappropriate’ online comments, and ‘unsuitable’ photographs, videos, and 
information about them.”). 
      One may wonder who would want to work for an employer who surfs 
revenge porn sites or other porn outlets where applicants’ naked photos 
might appear.  Because the operators of legitimate search engine sites, such 
as Google, apparently try to prevent explicit photos from readily showing up 
in search results, it is unlikely that an applicant’s images will pop up in 
ordinary online activity.  See Casey Newton, Google Tweaks Image Search to 
Make Porn Harder to Find, CNET (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://www.cnet.com/news/google-tweaks-image-search-to-make-porn-harder-
to-find/.  As the Supreme Court itself has noted, the only people who are 
likely to find sexually explicit images on the Internet are people who look for 
it.  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 854 (1997) (“Though such material is widely 
available, users seldom encounter such content accidentally. . . . Almost all 
sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the content.  For that 
reason, the ‘odds are slim’ that a user would enter a sexually explicit site by 
accident. . . . [T]he receipt of information on the Internet requires a series of 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/8
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Loss of job opportunities is a definite individualized harm, 
not to be minimized, but it is not the whole story.  The more 
fundamental reason that revenge porn leads to lost opportunity 
is that it conveys information that matters, at least to some 
people.  When revenge porn victims encounter employment 
barriers, it is ultimately because, like it or not, some employers 
apparently regard the fact that a person makes nude self-
portraits66 as a legitimate hiring concern—employers such as 
public schools, libraries, day care centers, churches, social 
welfare agencies and police forces come immediately to mind. 
And who is to say that employers such as restaurants, 
retailers, and other organizations whose staff directly serves 
the public may not have legitimate interests in knowing facts 
they believe relevant to the moral caliper of their employees?67 
Even apart from always-fraught questions of moral 
probity, however, an employer may simply consider it 
inadvisable or unnecessarily “risky” to hire people who engage 
in irregular behavior or who they see as personally weird.  
There are, after all, probably still a lot of employers who do not 
think it is exactly normal or decent to take pictures of oneself 
while not wearing clothes, having sex or the like. And even 
though I may personally deplore such censoriousness as 
prudish and old-fashioned, there are many others who 
evidently feel differently—and in a morally pluralist society, 
the mere fact we might dislike the choices that others make 
does not mean we have the right to declare ourselves the 
arbiter of what they should or need to know.  The premise of 
the First Amendment is that people should decide for 
themselves what they need to know, and it is not the place of 
government to make that decision for them.68 
 
affirmative steps.”). 
66. It has been estimated that eighty percent of the photos used in 
revenge porn were taken by the person depicted.  See Fighting Back Against 
Revenge Porn, supra note 7. 
67. As Susan Sontag famously opined: “Human sexuality is . . . a highly 
questionable phenomenon, and . . . remains one of the demonic forces in 
human consciousness.” SUSAN SONTAG, STYLES OF RADICAL WILL (1969). This 
view is probably not entirely passé. 
68. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (“[T]he 
general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess 
the value of the information presented.”); Greater New Orleans Broad. Assoc. 
v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 182-83 (1999); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode 
15
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To be sure, taking naked pictures of oneself does not 
necessarily make a person immoral or “risky.”69  But it also 
does not put a person into a legally protected class, either.  If 
there are employers who do not want employees who take 
naked pictures of themselves (as there evidently are70), there is 
no legal or constitutional reason why they do not have the 
discretion to make such choices.  And to the extent that some 
think nude self-portraits are a legitimate hiring concern, there 
would be definite harm if the only real evidence of people’s 
nude photos were to be governmentally suppressed.71  In sum, 
even though revenge porn obviously causes individualized 
harm, the Constitution assumes that there would be even 
greater harm in criminalizing the free flow of information 
concerning the activities that it reveals.72 
 
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 508-14 (1996). 
69. Indeed, my guess is that, in a few years’ time, people will look back 
and wonder what all the fuss was about—and the sooner it becomes known 
that just how common it is to take such pictures, the sooner people will stop 
acting as though doing so is somehow reprehensible or outré.  Cf. Steven G. 
Kellman, When Literature Was Dangerous, CHRON. REV. (June 13, 2014), 
http://chronicle.com/article/When-Literature-Was-
Dangerous/147039/?cid=cr&utm_source=cr&utm_medium=en (describing 
some of the 20th century history of banning books, including James Joyce’s 
now highly acclaimed Ulysses, which sells 100,000 copies per year today). 
70. See supra note 65. The lost job opportunities that have reportedly 
already occurred show that employers have the concerns. See id. 
71. Professors Citron and Franks note the possibility of making a 
“distinction between the public’s legitimate interest in knowing about the 
naked pictures and in actually seeing them.”  Citron & Franks, supra note 9, 
at 385.  It is not clear, however, what this might mean in practice.  Are they 
suggesting that the First Amendment is satisfied as long as people are 
allowed to make unsupported allegations about one another but the 
government can still make it a crime to provide the evidence or proof? 
72. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2672 (“The choice ‘between the dangers of 
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available’ 
is one that ‘the First Amendment makes for us.’”). 
   A legislature could, of course, declare as matter of public policy that people 
who take naked pictures of themselves are a legally protected class and, 
having done so, constitutionally restrict flows of information used to 
discriminate on that basis.  See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n 
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (allowing restriction of gender-
designated ads that facilitated illegal employment discrimination); Giboney v. 
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (holding that First 
Amendment does not protect speech that is an integral part of a criminal 
activity).  It apparently may not, however, create a legally protected class by 
the back-door route of restricting speech while leaving the right to 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/8
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What is more, employers are not the only ones who might 
find the truth about others’ doings to be relevant to their own 
needs, values and moral precepts.  People outside the 
employment context also want to know about conduct 
evidencing the character of the people with whom they deal.  
Parents like to know about those who come into contact with 
their children, people in business like to know the penchants 
(and, perhaps, susceptibility to blackmail) of those they must 
trust, and people who go out on dates want to know who it is 
they are dating.73  True, discrimination in employment, social 
relations or whatever based on posing for naked pictures may 
lead to bad decisions and invidious choices, but “the fear that 
people would make bad decisions if given truthful information 
cannot justify content-based burdens on speech.”74 
The bottom line is this: There is always a potential for 
harm in truth, especially the harm of getting found out.  This 
potential for individualized harm from truth does not, however, 
translate automatically into a governmental interest (much 
less a compelling interest) in keeping others in the dark.  
Indeed, the very reason that disclosures of a person’s arguably 
negative or less-than-flattering qualities may cause individual 
harm is precisely that the information may be valuable or 
relevant to the needs and values of others—the very kind of 
interest that the First Amendment is supposed to protect. So 
 
discriminate intact.  See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 182-83; 44 
Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 508-14 (repudiating the contrary position that the 
Court had taken earlier in Posadas de Puerto Rico Association v. Tourism Co. 
of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding a ban on advertising of legal 
gambling establishments)).  In the two more recent cases, the Court backed 
away from the idea, which underlay Posadas, that a legislative power to 
regulate an activity includes within it the power to restrict speech that tends 
to promote that activity.  Compare Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-46, with Greater 
New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 182-83, and 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 508-14. 
73. Notably, perhaps, there may be no general “public” interest in these 
kinds of “daily life matters” (as Professor Volokh dubbed them in his excellent 
analysis), but for the majority of people, most of the time, conversational 
topics like these are the ones that really count—the ones that supply the 
information that people need most.  See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, 
Information Privacy, and the Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People 
From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1, 32-39, 42-46 & nn.175-200 
(2000). 
74. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2658, 2672 (“The choice ‘between the dangers of 
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available’ 
is one that ‘the First Amendment makes for us.’”). 
17
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even if there were a “free-floating” balancing test for free 
speech (which there is not75), it is not obvious that the 
individualized harms caused by private information disclosures 
would necessarily outweigh the harm of keeping others in 
ignorance.  This other side of the harm-benefit equation is 
something that proponents of bans on revenge porn often 
appear to overlook. 
 
2. Truth Leads to Crime? 
 
Another kind of harm that has been mentioned as caused 
by revenge porn is that it “raises the risk of offline stalking and 
physical attack.”76  This is a very serious concern, of course, 
and that is why laws against stalking and physical attack exist 
and should be rigorously enforced.  It is elementary First 
Amendment law, however, that the government cannot justify 
a restriction on speech just because the speech might inspire 
somebody somewhere to commit a criminal act.77  Indeed, 
under the longstanding Brandenburg rule, the guarantees of 
free speech and press do not allow states to forbid even the 
outright advocacy “of force or . . .  law violation except where 
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”78 
 
3. Truth Hurts 
 
Still another kind of harm of revenge porn, and probably 
the most important, is the extreme emotional distress that it 
 
75. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (rejecting the idea 
of a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage as “startling and 
dangerous”). 
76. Citron & Franks, supra note 9, at 351.  See also Goode, supra note 7. 
77. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253-54 (2002); 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566-67 (1969).  See also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 
532 U.S. 514, 529-30 (2001) (noting that “[t]he normal method of deterring 
unlawful conduct is to impose an appropriate punishment on the person who 
engages in it. . . . But it would be quite remarkable to hold that speech by a 
law-abiding possessor of information can be suppressed in order to deter 
conduct by a non-law-abiding third party.”). 
78. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (emphasis added).  
See also supra note 72. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/8
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can cause to the persons whose pictures are non-consensually 
shared with others and, perhaps, the world.  This, too, can be a 
very serious harm and is not to be minimized.  But it is, once 
again, an individualized harm that, like most speech-harms, 
can only be avoided by suppressing the flow of truthful 
information that others may find valuable and useful to their 
own choices and needs. 
At any rate, the Supreme Court’s decisions have 
acknowledged that speech can sometimes be emotionally 
distressing, but the Court has never regarded this possibility 
as a justification for suppressing speech.  Quite the opposite, 
the Court has stressed that the capacity of speech to cause 
emotional distress is precisely one of the reasons why it needs 
to have constitutional protection—to shelter speech from the 
political backpressure that disagreeable emotive impacts can 
generate.  “Speech,” the Court recently wrote, “remains 
protected even when it may ‘stir people to action,’ ‘move them to 
tears,’ or ‘inflict great pain.’”79  Indeed, “the point of all speech 
protection . . . is to shield just those choices of content that in 
someone’s eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.”80  Therefore, 
“[s]peech does not lose its protected character . . . simply 
because it may embarrass others,”81 nor can speech be 
restricted or punished merely because it “may have an adverse 
emotional impact on the audience.”82  On the contrary, the 
Court has explicitly recognized that the First Amendment is “a 
defense in state tort suits . . . for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.”83 
It is true that, in protecting emotionally distressing 
speech, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the particular 
 
79. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670 (emphasis added) (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 
131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011)). 
80. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian 
& Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995)). 
81. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982). 
82. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). 
83. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 (emphasis added); see also Hustler, 485 
U.S. at 56 (upholding the First Amendment as a defense).  In both Snyder 
and Hustler, the Court made clear that its holdings involved public figures or 
matters of public interest and that it was taking no position with respect to 
cases that involved only matters of purely private concern.  In neither case, 
however, was the Court faced with a challenge to content-discrimination.  
19
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cases before it involved speech about public figures or matters 
of public concern.84  It has carefully reserved the question of 
how it might decide in a case that involved speech on matters 
of purely private significance.85  Perhaps this distinction 
between “public concern” and “private concern” will emerge as 
a factor in future strict-scrutiny analyses and lead to a new 
rule upholding restrictions on “private concern” speech that 
causes emotional harm.  If that ever happens, however, it 
suffices for now to say that it would represent a new addition to 
current First Amendment law.  It would also be contrary to the 
Supreme Court’s oft-mentioned view that it is not the place of 
the government to judge what speech is worthwhile enough to 
protect and then ban the speech that is not worth it.86  “Most of 
what we say to one another lacks . . . serious value . . . but it is 
still sheltered from Government regulation.”87 
In sum, given the stringent standards of proof of harm 
applicable to speech restrictions that discriminate based on 
content, it does not seem likely that revenge porn statutes of 
the kinds recently enacted or proposed would be able to survive 
strict scrutiny.  It bears remembering that the Supreme Court 
has, in the last several years, upheld First Amendment 
protection for such doubtfully beneficial speech forms as 
 
84. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215; Hustler, 485 U.S. at 51-56 (repeatedly 
stressing that plaintiff was a “public figure”). 
85. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220.  Citron and Franks write that the Court 
in Snyder “assumed that such claims could be upheld as constitutional . . . if 
the expression giving rise to the claims involved purely private matters.”  
Citron & Franks, supra note 9, at 382.  This conclusion is, however, hard to 
reconcile with the Court’s insistence that it was leaving open questions that 
lay outside the facts actually at issue (i.e., involving speech on a matter of 
public concern), viz. 
 
Our holding today is narrow. . . . [A]nd the reach of our 
opinion here is limited by the particular facts before us.  As 
we have noted, the sensitivity and significance of the 
interests presented in clashes between First Amendment 
and [state law] rights counsel relying on limited principles 
that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of 
the instant case. 
  Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
86. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010).  For additional 
cases, see infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text. 
87. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 479. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/8
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animal fighting and cruelty films,88 violent video games,89 
private data about doctors’ prescribing habits,90 virtual child 
pornography91 and false claims of having received the Medal of 
Honor.92  The Court is not quick to strike down speech it does 
not like.93 
 
B. Categorical Exceptions 
 
Another set of potential bases for upholding revenge porn 
laws are the so-called “categorical exceptions” to the First 
Amendment.  The categorical exceptions are “certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention 
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.”94  The rule for categorical exceptions 
is simple: If a particular speech utterance falls into one of the 
recognized categories, it does not enjoy First Amendment 
protections, such as the rule of strict scrutiny.95  As a result, 
the government can regulate the speech with more or less96 the 
same broad level of discretion and flexibility that applies in 
regulating non-speech conduct.97  The list of the categorical 
exceptions recognized to date is as follows:98 
 
 Defamation 
 Obscenity 
 Incitement (to imminent unlawful action) 
 
88. See id. (technically, because of the statute’s overbreadth, the Court 
did not actually get to the strict-scrutiny issue in striking down the statute 
down). 
89. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
90. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
91. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
92. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
93. See also supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
94. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). 
95. However, speech falling into a categorical exception may still be 
protected against content discrimination that is unrelated to reason the 
speech falls within the exception.  See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
383-95 (1992). 
96. See id. 
97. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
98. List is drawn from the opinion in United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 
2537, 2544 (2012). 
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 Speech integral to criminal conduct 
 True threats 
 Fraud 
 “Fighting words” 
 Child pornography 
 Grave and imminent threats to national security 
 
Immediately noticeable about this list is that none of the 
categorical exceptions appears to justify a comprehensive 
prohibition on non-consensual posting of others’ explicit 
images.  The exception for defamation may, for instance, 
provide an exemption for laws to punish falsehoods in revenge 
porn, but laws to forbid truthful revelations would not be 
covered.99  The obscenity exception may permit bans on legally 
obscene revenge porn, but only perhaps at the risk of also 
subjecting the obscenity’s producer to a risk of criminal 
prosecution.100  And, of course, the categorical exception for 
child pornography can be invoked to justify laws punishing the 
dissemination of explicit images that depict persons under 18 
years.101 
Unfortunately, not only do none of the existing categorical 
exceptions adequately fit the existing and proposed revenge 
porn laws, but the Supreme Court has been clear that it is not 
making new ones.  On the contrary, the Court has repeatedly 
stressed, the list of exceptions is confined to a few “historic and 
traditional categories . . . long familiar to the bar”102 and it has 
denied that there is any “freewheeling authority to declare new 
categories of speech outside the scope of the First 
 
99. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
100. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 43 (1973); Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 507 (1957).  If it is true that eighty percent of revenge 
porn images were originally produced by the persons depicted, see Fighting 
Back Against Revenge Porn, supra note 7, pursuing the images as obscenity 
may have unintended negative consequences for the victims.  See 18 U.S.C. § 
2257, discussed in supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
101. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
102. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (citing and quoting United States v. 
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010) and Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of 
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); 
see also Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011). 
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Amendment.”103  In particular, the Court has flatly rejected the 
idea that courts can “create new categories of unprotected 
speech by applying a ‘simple balancing test’ that weighs the 
value of a particular category of speech against its social costs 
and then punishes . . . speech if it fails the test”—calling the 
notion “startling and dangerous.”104 
In short, “without persuasive evidence that a novel 
restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore 
unrecognized) tradition of proscription,”105 having “a historical 
foundation in the Court’s free speech tradition,”106 it is very 
doubtful there will be any additions to the list of categorical 
exceptions.  The fact that the list of categorical exceptions 
appears to be essentially closed makes it particularly 
important to note what the list does not include.  The list of 
items not included is not a short one: 
Not Among the Categorical Exceptions to First Amendment: 
 
 Offensive speech 
 Badly motivated speech 
 Outrageous speech 
 Trifling and banal speech 
 Emotionally distressing speech  
 Pornography (non-”obscene”) 
 Private information disclosures 
 Non-consented to speech 
 “Harmful” speech (in se) 
 Speech re non-public figures 
 Low-value speech 
 Speech not of public concern 
 Entertainment speech 
 
While something might be said with respect to each one of 
these non-included categories, I will confine myself to the ones 
most likely to seem relevant to the context of revenge porn 
 
103. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472. 
104. Entm't Merchs., 131 S. Ct. at 2734 (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 
470). 
105. Id. 
106. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544. 
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238 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:1 
laws. 
 
1. Emotionally Distressing Speech 
 
 Emotional distress is an obvious harm of revenge porn.  
However, as already discussed in relation to strict scrutiny,107 
the fact that speech causes emotional distress is not seen as a 
ground for restricting it but, to the contrary, as a reason for 
protecting it.108  At any rate, based on the Court’s repeated 
statements in support of protecting emotionally upsetting 
speech,109 it seems fair to doubt that there is an as-yet 
unnoticed “historical foundation”110 to exclude it from First 
Amendment protection. Emotionally distressing speech is not 
likely to be discovered among the categories of speech whose 
“prevention and punishment [has] never been thought to raise 
any Constitutional problem.”111 
 
2. Private Information Disclosures 
 
By revealing pictures of intimate conduct and body parts to 
the world, revenge porn can dramatically surprise the privacy 
expectations of the persons depicted.  The specific privacy 
interest that revenge porn implicates is often called 
“information privacy,” that is, the interest that a person has in 
controlling others’ access to information about oneself.112  The 
question is whether there might be, an as-yet undiscovered, 
historical or traditional category of speech that is exempt from 
 
107. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
108. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (“‘[T]he point of all 
speech protection . . . is to shield just those choices of content that in 
someone’s eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.’”) (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. 
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995)). 
109. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
110. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544.  See Entm't Merchs., 131 S. Ct. at 2734. 
111. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). 
112. See Volokh, supra note 73, at 2.  Revenge porn can also intrude on 
the victim’s privacy interest in “seclusion,” particularly if the pictures in 
question were taken without the victim’s consent.  However, the general 
assumption in the revenge porn context (here, at least) is that the pictures in 
question were created either by, or with the consent of the persons depicted 
in them.  Invasions of “seclusion” privacy in creating the pictures in the first 
place would raise a range of other issues, which are left to other discussions. 
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the rule of strict scrutiny because it conveys private 
information. 
In at least one case involving photographs revealing 
truthful private information, the Court held the photographs 
not actionable.113  However, proponents of restrictions on 
private-information speech may find solace in the fact that the 
Court has been careful never to say that First Amendment 
rights will always trump state-created privacy rights.114  In a 
number of cases where it might have been apposite to lay down 
such a rule, the Court has always declined to do so.115  What is 
 
113. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 252-53 n.5 
(1974).  However, the Cantrell case may be of limited precedential value since 
the plaintiffs had proceeded on a “false-light theory of invasion of privacy,” id. 
at 249, and the Court did not discuss the “information-privacy” interest.  In 
addition, said the Court, the “case present[ed] no occasion to consider 
whether a State may constitutionally apply a more relaxed standard of 
liability for . . . false statements injurious to a private individual . . . .”  Id. at 
250. 
114. See, e.g., Citron & Franks, supra note 9, at 378-79. 
115. Perhaps the leading case that discusses the prudence of reserving 
the “information privacy vs. free speech” issue is Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 
U.S. 524, 532 (1989) (stating that “our cases have carefully eschewed 
reaching this ultimate question” of whether truthful publication can ever be 
punished).  Among other important cases, one might list: Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (“The capacity of technology to find 
and publish personal information, including records required by the 
government, presents serious and unresolved issues with respect to personal 
privacy and the dignity it seeks to secure.”); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 
514, 529 (2001) (referring to the Court’s “repeated refusal to answer 
categorically whether truthful publication may ever be punished consistent 
with the First Amendment”); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105 
(1979) (“Our holding in this case is narrow . . . there is no issue here of 
privacy.”); see Landmark Commc’ns v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838-39 (1978); 
Cox Broad. Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 488-97 (1975); Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 
250; Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967).  Indeed, there are several 
cases in which the Court has explicitly held that it would allow greater 
restrictions of speech on purely private matters.  See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759-61 (1985); Time, Inc. v. 
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976).  In these latter cases, however, the 
speech at issue was defamatory, meaning that it was already outside the 
protection of the First Amendment anyway.  Firestone, 424 U.S. at 450.  In 
that kind of context, the point of the public/private distinction is not to allow 
the government to suppress private-concern speech but to prohibit the 
suppression of public-concern speech.  See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 299 (1964).  That is to say, in cases of defamatory speech, the 
public/private distinction is invoked as an additional protection for speech, 
not as a justification for restricting it. 
25
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more, in its cases that have struck down restrictions on speech 
revealing private information, the Court has often noted that 
the speech in question, despite its private aspects, involved a 
matter of public significance or concern.116 
The problem is that, even though the Court has never said 
that truthful speech always trumps privacy interests117 (which 
it manifestly does not118), it has likewise never suggested that 
privacy interests could justify bypassing the strict scrutiny rule 
that normally applies in cases of content discrimination.119  
That is to say, the Court has never suggested that the privacy 
interests could be the basis of a categorical exception to First 
Amendment protection.  If there is, in fact, an information-
privacy categorical exception “long familiar to the bar,”120 this 
studied omission of the Court to ever say anything at all to 
acknowledge it seems, at the very least, rather odd.  In any 
 
116. See, e.g., Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533; Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 104 
(“matter of public significance”); Hill, 385 U.S. at 387-88.  Cf. Florida Star, 
491 U.S. at 532-34 (information obtained from a public record open to public 
inspection); Landmark, 435 U.S. at 838 (“truthful reporting about public 
officials in connection with their public duties”); Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 491 
(“obtained from public records”). 
    Actually, in Daily Mail, the Court arguably may not have entirely reserved 
the issue, having stated, for example, that “state action to punish the 
publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional 
standards,” Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 102, and that “[a]t issue is simply the 
power of a state to punish the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile 
delinquent's name lawfully obtained . . . .” Id. at 105-06.  See also id. at 101-
02 (stating that “a penal sanction for publishing lawfully obtained, truthful 
information . . . requires the highest form of state interest to sustain its 
validity”).  Moreover, the Court never quite said that the information at issue 
actually involved a matter of public significance, but only that no issue of 
privacy was involved.  Id. at 105.  Thus, the holding in Daily Mail arguably 
was purely about protecting the publication of truthful information, 
effectively establishing a standard of strict scrutiny for restrictions on such 
publication. 
117. But cf. Daily Mail, discussed in preceding footnote. 
118. For example, there seems to be no real question that wiretapping 
laws are constitutional as privacy protection measures despite the fact that 
they punish wiretappers for disclosing truthful private information that they 
illegally obtain.  See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526-29. 
119. See supra Parts II.A–B and accompanying notes.  For example, in 
Bartnicki, the Court stressed that wiretap laws, whose “basic purpose . . . is 
to protect the privacy of . . . communications,” do not discriminate on the 
basis of content.  Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
120. See supra note 102. 
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event, the Court’s silence on the issue hardly supports the 
conclusion that there is such an exception. 
There is also a serious policy reason for not elevating the 
understandable concern for information privacy into a legal 
right of persons to control what is disclosed about them.  The 
problem is that any such right would amount to a direct inroad 
on free expression.  That is to say, the interest in information 
privacy (or, at least, in controlling what others disclose about 
you) is directly opposed to the First Amendment interest in 
protecting free speech.  Put bluntly, freedom of speech and 
controls on speech are simply opposite sides of the same coin.  
As a result, the Court could only protect private-information 
interests at the direct expense of an express constitutional 
right.121 
In summary, although the Court has clearly shown 
concern about privacy interests, it has never even hinted that 
there is a categorical exception to the First Amendment that 
allows government to discriminate based on content just 
because the speech in question conveys private information.  It 
is doubtful, therefore, that there can be said to be a historical 
foundation for adding “information privacy” to the list of 
categorical exceptions that exempt speech from the rule of 
strict scrutiny.122 
 
121. While the Fourth Amendment somewhat impairs or, at least, 
complicates the efforts of governmental actors to invade personal private 
space, U.S. CONST. amend. IV, there is no recognized constitutional right 
protecting the privacy of private information as such. NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. 
Ct. 746, 756-57 (2011) (expressly declining to recognize such a right); see also 
id. at 764 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“A federal constitutional ‘right to 
information privacy’ does not exist.”), and  id. at 769 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(stating that “the Constitution does not protect a right to informational 
privacy”). In recently refusing to decide whether such a right exists, the 
Court consciously followed “the same approach . . . that the Court took more 
than three decades ago” in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) and Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). Notably, all three 
cases (Whalen, Nixon and Nelson) discussed only the possibility of a 
constitutional right of information privacy as against the government, and 
none of these cases even hinted (or “left open the question”) whether there 
might be some sort of constitutional right of information privacy that would 
limit the freedom to speak of other private persons. Clearly, on the law as it 
now stands, to suppress the speech of private individuals in order to protect 
other people’s private information would be to allow a state-created personal 
right to trump a fundamental right under the federal Constitution. 
122. Professor Volokh has argued that “privacy concerns might suffice to 
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3. Speech on Matters Not of Public Concern (Low Value) 
 
The question here is whether revenge porn might fall 
within an as-yet undiscovered “historic and traditional”123 
category of speech that is excluded from protection because it 
does not relate to a matter of public concern.124  Although the 
Court has at least once explicitly refused to recognize such a 
categorical exception,125 it has also made occasional statements 
suggesting that the First Amendment gives less protection to 
speech on topics that are not considered important to public 
debate.  In the recent case of Snyder v. Phelps, for example, the 
Court approvingly quoted a number of these statements, noting 
for instance that “not all speech is of equal First Amendment 
importance,”126 and adding that “speech on ‘matters of public 
concern’ . . . is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s 
protection’”127 but, “where matters of purely private 
 
justify narrow restrictions on clearly defined kinds of speech that very rarely 
have value—public or private,” suggesting nude photos or sex tapes as an 
example. Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, 
Criminal Harassment Laws and Cyberstalking, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 731, 762 
(2013). However, for the reasons set out supra text accompanying notes 60-
75, the premise of this argument—that nude photos rarely have value—
seems empirically dubious: The information that such pictures convey may 
very well matter, to at least some people. While Professor Volokh may not see 
much value in such photos, it is precisely because different people place 
different values on information that the First Amendment leaves the 
valuation of speech for the speakers and listeners to decide. See supra text 
accompanying note 68 & infra notes 132-36. 
123. See supra note 102. 
124. There is obviously some overlap between the subject of this 
subsection (speech unrelated to matters of public concern) and that of the 
previous section (speech conveying purely private information).  The two 
classes of speech are not necessarily identical.  Indeed, there could also 
conceivably be a third class of speech that combines these two, i.e., speech 
conveying private information that is not of public concern (as distinguished 
from private information that is of public concern).  There seems to be no 
evidence in the cases of a “historic or traditional” basis for this combination 
category, either. 
125. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)(“We in no sense suggest 
that speech on private matters falls into one of the narrow and well-defined 
classes of expression which carries so little social value, such as obscenity . . . 
.”). 
126. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011). 
127. Id. 
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significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are 
often less rigorous.”128  In other words, while “speech on public 
issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First 
Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection . . . 
[laws] restricting speech on purely private matters do not 
implicate the same constitutional concerns as limiting speech 
on matters of public interest.”129  Notably, however, these 
statements in Snyder were, strictly speaking, dicta,130 and the 
cases that the Court cited as original sources for the quoted 
language were cases that involved kinds of speech that 
normally do not merit full First Amendment protection 
anyway.131 
Despite the Court’s statements, such as those quoted in the 
preceding paragraph, the Court has also—perhaps even more 
frequently—made statements that firmly reject the idea of a 
two-tiered (or multi-tiered) scheme of free-speech protection 
based on the “public” value of the speech.  For example, even 
while the Court has noted that “[s]ome . . . ideas and 
information are vital, some of slight worth,” it has insisted that 
“the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the 
government, assess the value of the information presented.”132  
After all, the Court has observed, “[m]ost of what we say to one 
 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. It was dicta inasmuch as the Court found that the speech at issue 
there did relate to a matter of public concern, so there was no logical 
necessity to specify what rules might apply to speech that did not.  Snyder, 
131 S. Ct. at 1216-17. 
131. The original source cases that the Snyder Court cited for the above 
quotations (supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text) were Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (defamation) 
and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (government-employee speech). In 
these cases, the point of citing the “public concern” factor was not to justify 
withholding protection from speech because it was not on a matter of public 
concern but, quite the opposite, to confer protection on normally unprotected 
speech by invoking an exception to an exception for the speech that is on a 
matter of public concern. To run this wording from these cases in reverse 
would be to convert an exception that was designed to protect speech into an 
exception that suppresses it—a rather perverse result.  Snyder itself did 
involve speech on a matter of public concern, but Snyder did not decide that 
the outcome would have been different if it had not—any implication to that 
effect in Snyder would have been dictum. 
132. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671-72 (2011) (quoting 
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)). 
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another lacks . . . serious value . . . but it is still sheltered from 
Government regulation” and even ‘[w]holly neutral futilities . . . 
come under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats’ 
poems or Donne’s sermons.’”133  “Crudely violent video games, 
tawdry TV shows, and cheap novels and magazines are no less 
forms of speech than The Divine Comedy, and restrictions upon 
them must survive strict scrutiny . . . .  Even if we can see in 
them ‘nothing of any possible value to society . . . they are as 
much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of 
literature.’”134  The Court has considered the idea that the 
rights of free speech and press are solely “the preserve of 
political expression or comment upon public affairs” and flatly 
rejected it.135  In short, despite some statements of the Court, it 
simply cannot be taken as a general principle that legislatures 
are empowered to restrict or punish speech whenever the 
majority of legislators deem it to be “no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas” or only of “slight social value.”136 
There are, moreover, good policy reasons for rejecting the 
idea that there is any sort of “public concern” pre-requisite or 
qualifier on the scope of the First Amendment’s protection.  
 
133. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 479-80 (2010) (emphasis 
added). 
134. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2737 (2011) 
(quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)). 
135. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967); see also Connick, 461 
U.S. at 147 (“[The] First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly 
only to the extent it can be characterized as political. ‘Great secular causes, 
with smaller ones, are guarded.’”). 
136. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
Interestingly, the Court’s rationale for striking down the law in Snyder was 
apparently, simply, that: “What Westboro said, in the whole context of how 
and where it chose to say it, is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First 
Amendment, and that protection cannot be overcome by a jury finding that 
the picketing was outrageous.” Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219. Having said that, 
the Court did not consider it necessary to consider whether the law would 
pass strict scrutiny. In other words, in Snyder, the mere fact that the speech 
in question was political speech in a public forum provided enough reason in 
itself to strike down the law restricting it. Perhaps by dispensing with strict 
scrutiny for such very “specially” protected speech in Snyder, the Court was 
signaling to a new higher category of protected speech, while reserving the 
possibility of speech restrictions being valid under the strict scrutiny rule to 
cases that do not involve political speech on matters of public interest.  That 
is to say, maybe there is a nascent hierarchy here consisting of public-forum 
political speech, which is practically inviolable, as opposed to speech that is 
protected “merely” by the strict scrutiny rule. 
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One reason is that, as we have already seen, people need to 
have many kinds of information, not just important “public 
debate” information, to make informed and intelligent 
decisions in their daily lives.137  As the Supreme Court has 
recognized as far back as 1940: “Freedom of discussion . . . 
must embrace all issues about which information is needed or 
appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the 
exigencies of their period.”138  In modern times, for example, a 
“consumer’s concern for the free flow of commercial speech 
often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political 
dialogue.”139  “If the marketplace of ideas is to remain free and 
open, governments must not be allowed to choose which issues 
are worth discussing or debating . . . .”140 
There is also another problem with placing a narrow 
“public-interest” scope on First Amendment freedoms. Even 
though not all speech is equally necessary to operate as a 
democratic society, it would be dangerous to entrust 
legislatures with the power to make decisions, binding on all, 
that some speech (which it happens not to like) is unimportant 
enough to be dispensed with.  A First Amendment that 
conferred government with the power to censor and ban so-
called “unimportant” speech would give no real protection at 
all.141  Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressed strong 
 
137. See Volokh, supra note 73 (“daily life matters”); see generally supra 
text accompanying notes 66-74.  See also Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. 
Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (indicating that it is not necessary for a speaker “to 
spread his views before the public” in order to qualify to his message for 
protection as a matter of public concern). Accord Rankin v. McPherson, 483 
U.S. 378, 387 n.11 & 388 n.13 (1987). 
138 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (emphasis added). 
139. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011) (quoting 
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)).  See also United States 
v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001) (“[T]hose whose business and 
livelihood depend in some way upon the product involved no doubt deem 
First Amendment protection to be just as important for them as it is for other 
discrete, little noticed groups.”). 
140. Consol. Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-38 
(1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
141. The fundamental problem is that all the people who act in the name 
of government and wield its power have interests of their own, personal and 
institutional, and they are inevitably tempted to take those interests into 
account when making choices, bending their biases in their own favor. These 
temptations toward self-preference will apply as much to choices about 
speech restrictions as to other governmental choices that they make. The 
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reservations as to whether even judges should “decide on an ad 
hoc basis which publications address issues of general or public 
interest.”142  And this is not to mention the chilling effect on 
truthful speakers if people could be punished based on after-
the-fact determinations that the truths they spoke were not of 
sufficient public concern. 
Perhaps most importantly, even though the Court has 
frequently said that political and other public-interest speech 
is entitled to the greatest protection, it has never actually held 
that low-value speech is entitled to a lesser level of protection.  
On the contrary, it has specifically denied (as mentioned 
earlier) that there is any “freewheeling authority to declare 
new categories of speech outside the scope of the First 
Amendment.”143  That statement in itself suffices to conclude 
that there is no historical or traditional basis for recognizing a 
generic categorical exception for lower-value speech.  And when 
one considers some of the kinds of speech that have recently 
been confirmed to have constitutional protection against 
restrictive laws,144 it seems highly doubtful that the Court is 
inclined to incur the risks entailed in letting government 
declare classes of speech to be too unimportant for protection.  
 
4. Badly Motivated Speech 
 
At least one revenge porn statute expressly limits its 
prohibition to disclosures that are intended to cause harm to 
the person depicted.145  However, truthful speech that is 
otherwise protected under the First Amendment does not lose 
that protection merely because it was prompted by bad 
motivations.146  The reason is that, even when an ill-motivated 
 
persistent prevalence of corruption, both petty and grand, at every level of 
government, everywhere, counsels strongly against ignoring this possibility. 
142. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).  See also Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 
102 (“Freedom of discussion . . . must embrace all issues about which 
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope 
with the exigencies of their period.”). 
143. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010). 
144. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text. 
145. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2013). 
146. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964); see also FEC v. 
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speaker does speak out of hatred, the “utterances honestly 
believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the 
ascertainment of truth.”147  Therefore based on the precedents, 
there appears to be no historical or traditional basis for a “bad 
motivation” that exempt speech from the requirement of strict 
scrutiny under the First Amendment. 
 
5. Non-Consented to Speech 
 
Recently enacted and proposed revenge porn statutes 
typically make their restrictions applicable only if the persons 
in the pictures did not give advance consent to the disclosures 
of the images in question.  Consent provisos do not, however, 
necessarily redeem restrictions on speech protected by the 
Constitution.148 
While the Supreme Court has occasionally upheld 
“consent” limitations on First Amendment rights, these cases 
involved statutory rights of individuals to be protected from 
receiving unwanted messages or communications.149  The Court 
has never even hinted that the First Amendment permits laws 
that give private individuals a power of censorship, allowing 
them to control the content or messages that others express.150  
 
Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 468 (2007) (“a speaker’s motivation is 
entirely irrelevant”); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988) 
(highly offensive parody). 
147. Id.  See generally Volokh, supra note 122, at 773-76. 
148. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2669-70 (2011) 
(disapproving a consent proviso which, like the ones in recently enacted 
revenge porn statutes, “forced [acquiescence] in the State's goal of burdening 
disfavored speech by disfavored speakers”). 
149. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 734 (2000) (“Private 
citizens have always retained the power to decide for themselves what they 
wish to read, and within limits, what oral messages they want to consider.”); 
Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (refusal to receive 
pandering mail); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (refusal to 
receive literature distributed to homes). 
150. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 734 n.43 (acknowledging that “prior cases 
found governmental grants of power to private actors constitutionally 
problematic . . . . [where] the regulations allowed a single, private actor to 
unilaterally silence a speaker even as to willing listeners” and where the 
Court had expressed concern that “[i]t would confer broad powers of 
censorship, in the form of a ‘heckler’s veto,’ upon any opponent of indecent 
speech . . . .” (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997)). 
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After all, the guarantees of speech and press are fundamentally 
built on the idea that people should not have to get permission 
before being allowed to speak, even when they speak on 
sensitive topics or express disfavored viewpoints. 
The consent requirement in revenge porn laws is 
essentially just another name for prior restraint—a legal 
requirement to obtain “consent” before communicating.151  And 
prior restraints are a form of advance censorship that are 
among the least tolerated of restrictions on speech.152  While it 
is true that past concerns about “‘prior restraints’ . . . relate to 
restrictions imposed by official censorship,”153 a law that grants 
private individuals the absolute discretion, utterly 
unconstrained by the democratic process, to totally block 
dissemination of disfavored speech creates a system of 
censorship that would seem to be even more questionable than 
one controlled by public officials.154 
The conclusion so far is this: Unless the Supreme Court 
 
151. While it is true that the term prior restraint is “not self-defining” 
and may have in itself have “slight utility,” Alexander v. United States, 509 
U.S. 544, 567 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), what is clear is that a process 
“which requires the prior submission . . . to a censor avoids constitutional 
infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to 
obviate the dangers of a censorship system” —including a requirement that 
the censor bear the burden of proving that the speech content is unprotected  
and that there a provision for quick judicial review. Freeman v. Maryland, 
380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). A reasonable way to understand the difference 
between “prior restraints” and other kinds of restrictions is that prior 
restraints are essentially requirements to pre-clear speech before it can be 
lawfully uttered, meaning that a mere failure to pre-clear is subject to a 
sanction irrespective of whether the speech itself was otherwise subject to 
sanction. 
152. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979) (“Prior 
restraints have been accorded the most exacting scrutiny in previous cases.”); 
Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 592 (1976) (the government “carries 
a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a 
restraint”); Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) 
(holding that prior restraints on expression come to the court with “a ‘heavy 
presumption’ against its constitutional validity”); see also Near v. Minnesota, 
283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
153. Hill, 530 U.S. at 734 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
154. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964).  In any case, 
because revenge porn laws make the targeted speech prima facie illegal to 
utter, it is probably specious to say that the restraint on speech is anything 
but an official prior restraint by government on speech that it officially 
disfavors. 
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significantly changes the law, it is very doubtful that revenge 
porn laws along the lines of the ones currently enacted and 
proposed can be drafted in such a way that they will either (a) 
pass strict scrutiny, or (b) fit into one of the existing categorical 
exceptions.  However, this still leaves a third possibility for 
writing a valid revenge-porn law, namely, framing it in such a 
way that it can qualify under the rule permitting merely 
“incidental burdens” on speech.155  In the next section we 
consider the potential for fashioning a revenge porn statute 
that could be upheld as a merely “incidental” burden. 
 
C. Incidental Burdens (the O’Brien Rule) 
 
Even when a statute is meant to regulate non-speech 
conduct, it can still have “incidental” impacts on free 
expression.  For example, the laws forbidding trespass can 
incidentally limit a speaker’s freedom to express herself on 
premises where she has no right to be.156  However, statutes 
that impose merely “incidental” burdens on speech do not need 
to pass strict scrutiny; they are subject instead to a lesser level 
of scrutiny, now known as “intermediate scrutiny.”157  Such 
intermediate scrutiny requires only that the law: 
 
 be otherwise within legislature’s constitutional power;158 
 further a governmental interest that is both: 
o an important or substantial interest 
o unrelated to suppression of free expression; and 
 
155. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
156. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003); Lloyd Corp. v. 
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567-68 (1972) (“[T]his Court has never held that a 
trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general rights of free speech on 
property privately owned and used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes 
only.”). 
157. The term “intermediate scrutiny” did not appear in a majority 
opinion in the First Amendment context until Turner Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–42 (1994) (“regulations that are unrelated to 
the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny”), 
decades after elements of intermediate scrutiny review were first established 
in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (described in the text 
that immediately follows). 
158. I.e., valid apart from its impacts on speech; for example, as per the 
rational basis test. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22. 
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 impose no greater burden on speech than is essential to 
further the governmental interest159 
 
This test for reviewing “incidental burdens” on speech had 
its genesis in United States v. O’Brien.160  The defendant in 
O’Brien had been convicted under a statute that prohibited the 
destruction of draft cards (draft registration certificates).  
Because the defendant had burned his draft card publicly as a 
way of expressing protest, he claimed that the burning was a 
form of speech, protected by the First Amendment.  The Court 
accepted that the act of burning could be deemed a kind of 
“speech” but it upheld the conviction anyway. In doing so, the 
Court reasoned that the statute had a constitutionally valid 
purpose other than to regulate speech or the speaker’s message 
and that the impingement on speech was merely “incidental” to 
the statute’s valid non-speech-related purpose.  For such 
incidental impingements on speech, the Court established the 
test for validity (now known as “intermediate scrutiny”) that 
was set out in the preceding paragraph. 
 
III. A Proposed Constitutional Revenge Porn Law 
 
The “incidental burdens” rule from the O’Brien case161 
offers a possible approach to drafting a law that addresses the 
principal emotional harms of revenge porn without being 
subject to the high hurdle of strict scrutiny.  The key is to draft 
a law that defines its prohibition in such a way that its burden 
on speech is merely “incidental” to a valid non-speech-related 
purpose, thus qualifying the law for review under O’Brien’s less 
exacting intermediate-scrutiny standard.  As long as the law’s 
primary prohibition can qualify for and pass intermediate 
scrutiny, any burden that the law incidentally imposes on 
speech would be constitutionally permissible under O’Brien. 
Indeed, any speech uttered in furtherance of violations of the 
law would be speech integral to a criminal act and, as such, 
 
159. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
160. Id. 
161. See supra II.C. 
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would fall within a categorical exception.162 
To write a revenge-porn law whose burden on speech is 
only “incidental,” one must take care to couch the law’s 
prohibition in terms that do not show a purpose to target, 
directly or indirectly, any particular speech-content as such.  
For example, it would not work to simply prohibit “speech that 
causes extreme emotional distress,” as this would amount to a 
content-based regulation of speech.163  But what a revenge-porn 
law could validly do is criminalize any act164 intended to cause 
 
162. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298-300 (2008) 
(holding that the Constitution does not protect speech that is uttered to 
further the commission of a crime); accord Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice 
Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). See generally supra Part II.B. (Categorical 
Exceptions). 
   The Supreme Court has not yet clearly explained the relationship between 
the rule for “incidental” burdens on speech (which are subject to intermediate 
scrutiny) and the rule for speech “integral” to crime (which is entirely 
excluded from First Amendment protection). It seems obvious, however, that 
an utterance cannot be deemed an integral part of a crime unless there is a 
validly enacted “crime” for the speech to be integral to. If this assumption is 
correct, then it follows that the categorical exception for speech integral to 
crime can only apply if there is a predicate crime that can pass intermediate 
scrutiny under the incidental-burdens rule. In other words, every speech-
burdening statute must, to be valid, either be at least able to pass 
intermediate scrutiny or fall within a categorical exception. While most 
criminal statutes should have no trouble passing the intermediate-scrutiny 
test, such passage cannot be taken as a foregone conclusion, especially in the 
case of crimes enacted out of an animus toward certain speech content. In 
any event, it is assumed in the present discussion that the statutory 
language proposed in the text would have to be able to pass intermediate 
scrutiny. 
163. A law that regulates speech based on its effects on listeners is 
considered to be a content-based regulation. See supra note 37 and infra text 
accompanying notes 170-73. And, of course, a law that specifically singles a 
particular subject matter for restriction (e.g., by prohibiting only sexually 
themed or nude photos that cause distress) would be even more open to 
challenge as a content-based regulation of speech. 
164. The word “act” as used here and in the language proposed below is 
to be understood as defined in the Model Penal Code, i.e., “a bodily 
movement.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(2). That is to say, it is solely the 
defendant’s bodily movements (and accompanying mental state) that are 
defined as elements of the crime, and not the actual result or effects that the 
act may have. To be clear, my argument for the constitutionality of the 
language proposed below is no way dependent on the supposed distinction 
between “conduct” and “speech.” Indeed, as the Court has essentially 
recognized, there is no realistic way to draw such a distinction. Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2010) (as long as the 
“conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a 
37
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or any attempt to cause the non-speech harm of extreme 
emotional distress.  A very simple version of such a statute 
might read as follows: 
 
“It is a criminal offense for any person, in the 
absence of a purpose to convey or disseminate 
truthful information or ideas, to do any act 
intended to cause or otherwise attempt to cause 
extreme emotional distress to another person.” 
 
While it is true that the res gestae of this crime might 
usually consist mainly of speech, the fact that speech is used as 
a means to accomplish a criminal result or attempt does not 
mean the First Amendment shields the perpetrator’s actions.165  
For example, the Supreme Court made clear in United States v. 
Williams166 that the First Amendment permits punishment 
even of pure word crimes as long as the words are spoken as an 
integral part of an offense under a valid criminal statute.  A 
perhaps closer analogy for the proposed language is the 
prohibition, contained in Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
that forbids sex discrimination by creating a hostile workplace 
environment.167  The Supreme Court has stated its approval of 
this prohibition explaining that, as long as “the government 
does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, 
 
message,” the strict-scrutiny standard applies). In any event, under the 
reasoning of O’Brien, the distinction is not necessary or constitutionally 
useful anyway. The more realistic distinction is between conduct that conveys 
message-content and other (non-expressive) conduct—and the rule is that the 
former can be regulated just as much as the latter except:  (1) content-based 
regulations of the former are generally subject to strict scrutiny, and (2) 
content-neutral regulations of the former are subject to intermediate 
scrutiny, under O’Brien. 
165. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 298-300; see also R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992), quoted infra text accompanying note 168. 
166. 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008) (upholding a law that criminalizes offers to 
sell child pornography or other material that the offeror describes as such). 
“Many long established criminal proscriptions—such as laws against 
conspiracy, incitement, and solicitation—criminalize speech . . . that is 
intended to induce or commence illegal activities.” Id. Indeed, words are a 
crucial component of many crimes and attempts to commit crimes (e.g., 
uttering “your money or your life,” or “how’d you like to buy some cocaine?”). 
167. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); 29 CFR § 1604.11 (1991); see also 18 
U.S.C. § 242 (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (2012); R.A.V., 505 U.S. 390. 
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acts are not shielded from regulation merely because” of what 
they express.168  Based on this reasoning, the First Amendment 
does not automatically prevent enforcing Title VII to redress 
workplace sexual harassment even when the harassment is 
effectuated by means of speech. The reason is that Title VII: 
 
 is targeted at employment discrimination (in essence, a 
non-speech result), but 
 does not restrict any particular speech, message content 
or viewpoint as such.169 
 
There is, however, an objection to this reasoning.  As 
Professor Volokh points out in an analogous context, when a 
law restricts or punishes speech because listeners are 
distressed or outraged by its content, the law should be treated 
as a content-based regulation and, therefore, subject to strict 
scrutiny.170  The leading case is Boos v. Barry,171 which held 
 
168. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 390 (using Title VII as an example; emphasis 
added); see also Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 F.3d 703, 
710 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Harassment law generally targets conduct, and it 
sweeps in speech as harassment only when consistent with the First 
Amendment.”); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
169. This is not to say that Title VII analysis is always simple or clear 
cut. Sometimes discrimination might inhere in the very ideas that a person 
expresses. For example, a campus worker might cause some of her co-workers 
feel very uncomfortable by propounding serious and reasoned arguments that 
old white males should not remain in college teaching (e.g., because students 
don’t easily relate to them, etc.). See Should Older Academics Be Forced to 
Retire?, THESIS WHISPERER (Sept. 10, 2014), 
http://thesiswhisperer.com/2014/09/10/older-academics-please-retire-now/.  It 
is said, however, that “when Title VII is applied to sexual harassment claims 
founded solely on verbal insults, pictorial or literary matter, the statute 
imposes content-based, viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on speech”—
which seems to mean that Title VII cannot be constitutionally applied 
against bigoted expressive conduct, no matter how hostile it is to co-workers. 
DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 597 (5th Cir. 
1995). See also Rodriguez, 605 F.3d at 710. Even if the First Amendment 
analysis under Title VII is not entirely free of doubt, however, it nonetheless 
seems clear enough that the First Amendment leaves ample room for taking 
verbal behavior into account in determining whether a “hostile workplace 
environment” has been created or allowed. The reasoning used to uphold such 
prohibitions provides a model for upholding laws that punish communicative-
type acts in furtherance of purposes to cause other prohibited harms as well. 
170. Volokh, supra note 122, at 769 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 
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that regulations of speech are considered to be content 
discrimination if they restrict speech based on the “direct 
impact the speech has on its listeners . . . [its] emotive impact 
on its audience”172  Accordingly, Professor Volokh argues, a law 
can be considered a content-based regulation of speech even 
when the law does not mention content at all.173  It is enough if 
the law restricts speech-content based on listeners’ reactions to 
it. 
Whatever the merit of Professor Volokh’s arguments (and 
there is much to support them174), they should not pose an 
obstacle to a statute that creates an otherwise valid criminal 
offense, even if it “incidentally” burdens speech.  The question 
is, then, whether the statutory language proposed here could 
be considered to create a valid criminal offense despite the fact 
that it would almost inevitably place disproportionate burdens 
on certain speech.175 
The first step in answering this question is to determine 
whether a law embodying the above-proposed language would, 
apart from its burden on speech, create a valid criminal 
offense.  The answer is almost certainly yes: the conduct that 
the proposed language prohibits (viz. acting with an intention 
to cause or otherwise attempting to cause extreme emotional 
distress) is a form of socially harmful conduct that a legislature 
 
1207, 1218-19 (2011)). 
171. 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
172. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321; see also Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist 
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992) (“Listeners' reaction to speech is not a 
content-neutral basis for regulation.”). 
173. Volokh, supra note 122, at 768-70. 
174. See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518 (2014) (upholding the 
content-neutrality of a law restricting abortion-clinic picketing). In that case, 
the Court made the following distinction: 
 
If . . . the speech [in question] caused offense or made 
listeners uncomfortable, such offense or discomfort would 
not give the Commonwealth a content-neutral justification 
to restrict the speech. All of the problems identified by the 
Commonwealth here, however, arise irrespective of any 
listener’s reactions. 
Id. at 2532 (emphasis added). 
175. The O’Brien (incidental burdens) rule “does not provide the 
applicable standard for reviewing a content-based regulation of speech . . . .” 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010). 
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has, at least presumptively, the constitutional power to 
deter.176  That is to say, such a prohibition seems to fall easily 
within the legislature’s “large discretion . . . to determine . . . 
what the interests of the public require, [and] what measures 
are necessary for the protection of such interests.”177 
The next step is to determine whether the law could be 
valid even though it would likely burden some kinds of speech-
content more than others.  Again, the answer is almost 
certainly yes: as the Court recently stated: “a facially neutral 
law does not become content based simply because it may 
disproportionately affect speech on certain topics.”178  To 
paraphrase the Court: “[The prohibited harms] are problems no 
matter what caused them.”179  What is more, even though the 
above-proposed language would punish expressive acts in 
some180 of its applications, they are not punished because of the 
defendant’s communicative purpose or impact181 but rather 
 
176. Under the “rational basis” test. See supra text accompanying notes 
20-22. 
177. Id. 
178. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. at 2531. 
179. Id. Indeed, the harms in a revenge-porn case (extreme emotional 
distress) are likely to be vastly more serious than the prohibit harms referred 
to in the Court’s statement quoted in the text (blocking the sidewalk). 
180. It goes without saying (though perhaps is not crucial) that there are 
ways to inflict emotional distress other than by means of speech. It therefore 
seems fair to say that a law based on the proposed language would punish 
expressive acts only in “some” instances. 
181. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) (noting a distinction 
between expressive acts that “seek to disseminate a message to the general 
public” and those that that merely “intrude upon the targeted [listener], and 
to do so in an especially offensive way”); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 
703, 714-18 (2000); Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 F.3d 
703, 710 (9th Cir. 2010) (“For instance, racial insults or sexual advances 
directed at particular individuals in the workplace may be prohibited on the 
basis of their non-expressive qualities . . . as they do not ‘seek to disseminate 
a message to the general public’”). While Frisby also suggested, in the 
residential picketing context, that even a “broader communicative purpose” 
may not save the offensive picketing in question, Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486, that 
suggestion may merely reflect the fact that the particular picketing in the 
case—deliberately targeted to disturb the sanctity of a person’s home—
entailed geographical privacy effects that can be regulated as time, place and 
manner restrictions (also subject to intermediate scrutiny).  That kind of 
geographical time-place-manner justification would not, however, be 
applicable in cases involving communications via the Internet, which are not 
location-specific. So even though revenge porn raises serious privacy 
concerns, those concerns (unlike the picketing in Frisby) are content or 
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because the defendant, without communicative purpose, acted 
in furtherance of a legislatively prohibited objective.  They are 
punished because the defendant endeavored, without 
communicative purpose, to produce a result that an otherwise 
valid law has makes it a crime to endeavor to produce. 
Unpacking the Court’s points quoted in the prior 
paragraph, we can see two potentially relevant distinctions 
between the “disproportionate” burdens entailed in the 
statutory language proposed above and laws (such as those in 
Boos v. Barry) that discriminate impermissibly based on 
listeners’ reactions.  First, there is the distinction between 
basing speech restrictions on (a) the listener impacts that the 
speaker intends to have, vs. (b) those that the speech actually 
has.  Second, there is the distinction between punishing a 
person who acts with a communicative purpose vs. punishing 
one who acts without such a purpose. 
The first of these two distinctions (intended vs. actual 
impacts) is, obviously, a rather nice one—perhaps too nice to be 
tenable.  At any rate, although the Court has apparently never 
ruled on the point, there is good reason to think that the first 
distinction would not be sufficient in itself to distinguish the 
revenge-porn law proposed above from laws that were 
disapproved in cases like Boos v. Barry.182  An argument that it 
should not be sufficient might go something like this: 
 
The fundamental point of speech is to have 
impacts on listeners’ minds—increasing their 
knowledge, changing their opinions, affecting 
emotional states, and so on. It would therefore be 
a rank evasion of the First Amendment if 
legislatures could discriminate against content 
and viewpoints they do not like by cagily basing 
their speech restrictions, not on the actual 
impacts the speech has on listeners, but on the 
listener-impacts that speakers intend. Consider, 
 
viewpoint concerns and not concerns about time, place, or manner. A speech 
regulation that discriminates based on content or viewpoint concerns must, 
unlike time, place and manner discrimination, pass strict scrutiny (unless the 
speech falls within a categorical exception). 
182. Discussed supra text accompanying notes 170-73. 
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for example, a law that forbids “trying to 
engender feelings of hate or animosity toward 
people of Sharmandian ancestry.” There may be 
obvious good reasons for wanting to enact such a 
law, but doing so would nonetheless be (under 
this argument) a pure evasion of the First 
Amendment. That is to say, there is (arguably) a 
First Amendment right to urge others to feel 
hate or animosity toward any group one chooses, 
whether it be the innocent Sharmandians, on one 
hand, or pedophiles, terrorists, drug traffickers, 
cyberbullies, misogynists, capitalists, lawyers or 
whatever.183 
 
Assuming the foregoing argument is correct, then the first 
of the two potential distinctions (actual vs. intended impacts on 
listeners) is not in itself sufficient save a law from invalidity as 
content discrimination.  That is to say, there is a good 
possibility the Court would find speech restrictions based on 
intended listener impacts to be just as much content 
discrimination as restrictions based on actual listener impacts.  
That being so, the question would then be how laws like the 
(invalid) Sharmandian law could be distinguished from laws 
that forbid, for example, verbal conduct creating a hostile 
workplace environment or inflicting extreme emotional 
distress. 
Assuming that, indeed, these two kinds of laws can be 
constitutionally distinguished at all, the most plausible basis 
would seem to focus on the defendant’s communicative 
purpose—or lack thereof.  The law in the Sharmandian 
example presupposes that engendering hate or animosity 
 
183. See Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F. 2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985); 
see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Cf. Stanley v Georgia, 
394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the 
thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.”). Although a 
government is no doubt permitted to guide or influence public opinion, it is 
not permitted to do so by banning speech that it does not favor. Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671-72 (2011)(reasoning that “a State's failure 
to persuade does not allow it to hamstring the opposition” and “the State 
cannot engage in content-based discrimination to advance its own side of a 
debate”). 
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precisely is the defendant’s communicative purpose, and it 
seeks to punish, probably impermissibly, the use of 
communication to further that purpose.  By contrast, hostile-
workplace laws and emotional-distress laws do not presuppose 
a communicative purpose (such as, for instance, “seek[ing] to 
disseminate a message to the general public”184), and they are 
framed in such a way that they can operate irrespective of such 
a purpose.  The underlying legal principle to make this 
distinction might be formulated like this: the application of a 
statute cannot be said to be content-discrimination unless 
there is purposeful communicative content for it to apply to.  
When the conduct triggering coverage under a statute does not 
consist of communicating a message, “then the less stringent 
standard . . . announced in O’Brien for regulations of 
noncommunicative conduct controls.”185  Accordingly, the 
crucial distinction that may save the above-proposed revenge-
porn law (along with hostile-workplace laws and emotional-
distress laws) is its requirement186 that the defendant has 
pursued a prohibited intention in the absence of a purpose to 
communicate facts or ideas.187 
 
184. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486, quoted to similar effect in Rodriguez, 605 
F.3d at 710. See generally supra note 181. 
185. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2010). 
Note that the first part of the sentence closely tracks, but states the obverse 
of, the Supreme Court’s wording at the same place, quoted supra note 164. 
Notably, the seminal O’Brien case, which established the incidental-burdens 
rule, took pains to make clear that the governmental interest and statutory 
impingement on speech in that case were limited to the 
noncommuicative aspects of the defendant’s conduct, that the defendant was 
convicted solely for the noncommuicative impact of his conduct “and nothing 
else.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1968). 
186. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 605 F.3d at 710. 
187. It is possible that a lack of communicative purpose may be, in itself, 
enough deprive a defendant’s acts of First Amendment protection. See Texas 
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 
405, 410-11 (1974) (reiterating that, in order for conduct to be considered 
protectable as speech, the defendant must have “[a]n intent to convey a 
particularized message”)). On the other hand, there is good reason to be 
reluctant to establish a rule that invites courts and juries to decide that a 
given archetypally communicative act (such as talking or Internet posting) 
lacks communicative purpose and is, therefore, punishable. Such a rule 
would, however, be less problematic if its application were limited to cases in 
which it was also found that the defendant intentionally endeavored to 
produce a certain result and the legislature otherwise has the power to 
criminalize such an endeavor. 
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 If the foregoing analysis is correct, then a legislature has 
presumptive power to prohibit the harm of doing acts intended 
to cause extreme emotional distress and, as per Coakley, that 
legislative power is not diminished by the fact that the 
prohibition may “disproportionately affect speech on certain 
topics.”188  Thus, the proposed statutory language should 
satisfy the first prong of intermediate scrutiny for “incidental” 
burdens, viz. that the prohibition be within legislature’s 
constitutional power to enact.  The statute employing the 
proposed language also would satisfy the other three 
qualifications of intermediate scrutiny (set out above), namely: 
 
1. The government has an interest that is obviously an 
important one – the emotional well-being of its 
citizens. 
2. That governmental interest is, in itself, unrelated to 
suppression of free expression. 
3. The burden on speech is “no greater than essential” to 
further the government interest because the law would 
define the defendant’s actions as a crime only in the 
“absence of a purpose to convey or disseminate truthful 
information or ideas” and it takes into account the rule 
that protects even badly motivated efforts to express 
the truth.189 
 
 Finally, by not limiting statute’s prohibition specifically to 
explicit photographic and video images, the proposal avoids the 
implication from “underinclusiveness” that the legislature’s 
real aim is not to address the emotional and privacy harms of 
revenge porn but, rather, to discriminate on the basis on 
content against sexual messages that it does not like.190 
IV. Conclusion 
 
188. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014). 
189. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text. 
190. See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1975) (“By 
singling out movies containing even the most fleeting and innocent glimpses 
of nudity the legislative classification is strikingly underinclusive. There is no 
reason to think that a wide variety of other scenes . . . would be any less” 
harmful to the alleged governmental interest); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 
U.S. 524, 542 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); 
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465-67 (1980). 
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It appears that most of the revenge-porn laws recently 
proposed and enacted, which simply punish sexually-themed 
images disseminated without consent of persons depicted, are 
unconstitutional as content-based regulations of speech that 
cannot pass strict scrutiny or fit within a categorical exception 
to the First Amendment.  However, by framing a law in such a 
way that it establishes an otherwise valid non-speech crime 
whose burden on speech is only incidental to that crime, a 
legislature should be able to address the primary harms of 
revenge porn without its law being subject to strict scrutiny as 
content discrimination, viewpoint discrimination or speaker 
discrimination—in the exactly same way that Title VII 
presumably does not illicitly rely on any of these 
discriminations to achieve its statutory goals.  However, even 
though there is reason to believe that a statute along these 
lines could survive constitutional scrutiny as an incidental 
burden on speech, one cannot be sure.191  After all, such a law 
would still represent, in the final analysis, an initiative by 
government to suppress speech that it does not favor, and the 
basic meaning of the First Amendment is to prohibit exactly 
that sort of thing. 
 
191. See supra note 170-87. Nor is it necessarily certain that such a law 
would be a good idea. See Budde, supra note 8, at 35-40. While few would 
disagree that it would be nice to be rid of revenge porn, there is still the 
separate question of whether it is a good idea to criminalize the infliction of 
extreme emotional distress. Compare Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Case for a 
Criminal Law Theory of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 5 CRIM. 
L. BRIEF 33 (2009), available at 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/571/, with John A. Humbach, Is 
America Becoming a Nation of Ex-Cons? ___ OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. ___ 
(forthcoming). 
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